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Back to the future: Prohibiting surrogacy for singles, 
same-sex and shorter-term heterosexual couples in 
Queensland 
Malcolm K Smith, Lindy Willmott, Pip Trowse and Ben White 
 
This article considers the regulatory position concerning altruistic surrogacy in Queensland, focusing on 
the intended changes to the current legal framework announced by the Government in June 2012. The 
previous Government had made significant progress by reforming surrogacy laws in 2010. However, that 
progress is at risk of being reversed. The proposed changes to the law would make it a criminal offence to 
enter into an altruistic surrogacy arrangement for certain individuals or couples. If enacted, the offence 
would only apply in altruistic surrogacy cases where the intended parent or parents are either single, in a 
same-sex relationship, or are in a heterosexual relationship of less than two years. Moreover, if enacted the 
offence would apply extra-territorially. We argue that these changes represent a retrograde step for the law 
and urge the Government to reconsider. This is based on the fact that they are out of step with current 
social attitudes, are contrary to the spirit of anti-discrimination laws, and that they are unjustified in terms 
of child welfare concerns. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The road to surrogacy law reform in Queensland has been paved with mixed intentions, and that trend is set to 
continue. The legislation originally enacted in Queensland, the Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld), made 
altruistic surrogacy a criminal offence. Even an offer to act as an altruistic surrogate, made by one person to 
another, constituted a criminal offence, and a person convicted of such an offence could be imprisoned for three 
years.1 Queensland was the only Australian jurisdiction in which altruistic surrogacy constituted a criminal 
offence. This situation continued for more than two decades until the enactment of the Surrogacy Act 2010 
(Qld) by the then Labor Party Government. Under this legislation, altruistic surrogacy is permitted, and a 
surrogacy arrangement can be entered into by a married couple, de facto couple (heterosexual or same-sex) or a 
single man or woman. The 2010 surrogacy legislation formed part of a socially progressive agenda of the Labor 
Government. In November 2011, the government also passed the Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld) which 
allowed heterosexual and same-sex couples to formally register their relationship as a ‘civil partnership’ with 
the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages, and to formally celebrate that union.  
The Liberal National Party (LNP) Government, led by Campbell Newman, was elected to office by a landslide 
in March 2012, and is in the process of overturning these reforms. The Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld) has 
already been amended by renaming it the Relationships Act 2011 (Qld), and removing the ability of a same-sex 
couple to celebrate the registration of their union by a ceremony sanctioned by the Act. This reform addressed 
apparent concerns that such a ceremony ‘could be perceived as mimicking a marriage ceremony’.2 In the Record 
of Proceedings of Parliamentary Debates surrounding the amendments to the Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld), 
Queensland’s Attorney-General, Jarrod Bleijie, indicated that the government would also be amending the 
surrogacy legislation to prevent heterosexual de facto couples in a relationship for less than two years, all same-
sex couples, and single men and women from accessing surrogacy arrangements.3 This is despite a commitment 
given by Campbell Newman before the election that the current legislation would not be amended.  
The authors are of the view that the surrogacy reforms proposed by the LNP Government are misguided, and 
should not proceed. This article commences by reviewing the history of surrogacy regulation in Queensland, 
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1 Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld), s 3(1). 
2 Civil Partnerships and other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012 (Qld), Explanatory Notes, p 2. 
3 Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (21 June 2012) p 994 (Jarrod Bleijie). 
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including the reasoning behind the progressive reform that underpinned the 2010 legislation, and then considers 
the nature of the reform being proposed by the LNP Government. To facilitate comparisons with other 
legislative models, the surrogacy frameworks in other Australian States and Territories are reviewed. Finally, 
the authors provide three grounds to argue that the current surrogacy laws in Queensland should not be 
amended: the proposals for reform are out of step with the trends in eligibility criteria in assisted reproductive 
technology law and practice, inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination and, most significantly, are 
not supported by available research about what is in the best interests of a child. 
 
THE WINDING ROAD OF SURROGACY REFORM IN QUEENSLAND 
The regulation of surrogacy arrangements, and the nature that such regulation should take, has been on the 
political agenda in Queensland for almost three decades. In 1983, the Queensland Cabinet appointed a Special 
Committee to consider a range of issues relating to assisted reproductive technology.4 Although the major 
component of the review related to the regulation of such technology, the committee also reviewed and 
commented on surrogacy arrangements. The Committee published its report, known as the Demack Report, in 
February 1984.5  
The committee identified potential problems that could arise from a surrogacy arrangement, including severe 
psychological stress on a child, potential exploitation if surrogate mothers are paid for their services, the 
possibility of severe emotional stress for a surrogate mother who relinquishes her child, and problems that could 
arise if the parents refused to take custody of the child.6 In the view of the committee, the identified problems 
were ‘such that the most prudent course would seem to be to leave such agreements unenforceable, at least until 
experience demonstrates whether regulation of such agreement is required in the interest of society and of the 
parties involved’.7 
Notwithstanding the problems identified by the committee, it concluded: 
 
 [I]t would not be desirable, at least at present, to make surrogacy arrangements criminal offences, and that the lack of 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts will probably suffice to prevent the widespread encouragement of surrogate 
motherhood arrangements. However, the matter is one which will need review from time to time.8  
 
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Demack Report that entry into a surrogacy arrangement should not 
constitute a criminal offence, the subsequently enacted Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld) prohibited entry 
into all surrogacy arrangements, whether commercial or altruistic. The Act made it an offence to enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement, or even to offer to enter into such an arrangement.9 The potential scope of the legislation 
was extraordinarily wide. A woman who made an offer to act as a surrogate to an infertile woman would have 
committed an offence, punishable by up to three years imprisonment, even if neither woman contemplated any 
payment of money. This put the Queensland legislation out of step with legislation in other Australian 
jurisdictions where only commercial surrogacies were regarded as criminal offences.10 
The draconian nature of the legislation was further exacerbated because it purported to be extra-territorial in 
effect. If the person who entered into an agreement (or offered to do so) was ordinarily a Queensland resident, 
                                                          
4 The Committee was chaired by Justice Demack (Supreme Court of Queensland) and was comprised of Professor Kevin Ryan (QC, part-
time member of the Queensland Law Reform Commission), Sister Regis Mary Dunne (Director, Provincial Bio Ethics Centre for the 
Queensland Catholic Dioceses), Reverend Dr John Morgan (Warden, St John’s College, University of Queensland), Dr Jean Collie 
(Director, Division of Research and Planning, Department of Health), Professor Eric Mackay (Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 
University of Queensland) and Dr Allan Halladay (Senior Lecturer in Social Work, University of Queensland). 
5 Select Committee, Parliament of Queensland, Report of the Special Committee Appointed by the Queensland Government to Enquire into 
the Laws Relating to Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilisation and Other Related Matters (1984). 
6 Select Committee, Parliament of Queensland, n 5, pp 115-116. 
7 Select Committee, Parliament of Queensland, n 5, p 116. 
8 Select Committee, Parliament of Queensland, n 5, pp 117-118. In its formal recommendations, however, the committee recommended that 
it should be made illegal to advertise to recruit women to undergo surrogate pregnancy, or to provide facilities for persons who wish to make 
use of the services of such women (recommendation D1), p 146. 
9 Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld), s 3(1). 
10 At the time, commercial surrogacy was an offence in Victoria and South Australia (in relation to agencies only) pursuant to the Infertility 
Medical Procedure Act 1984 (Vic) and the Family Relationship Act 1975 (SA). However, altruistic surrogacy was not an offence. At that 
time, legislation in relation to surrogacy had not been passed in the other States and Territories of Australia. 
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she (or he) would have committed an offence, even if the relevant conduct occurred outside Queensland, in a 
jurisdiction where the conduct was lawful.11    
Despite altruistic surrogacy being criminalised in Queensland, there is evidence that such arrangements still 
occurred.12 Nevertheless, prosecutions were infrequent.13 It is not known whether this is because such conduct 
was difficult for police to uncover; or it was possible to investigate and identify such practices, but it was not a 
priority for the police to pursue; or such conduct was pursued by police, but prosecutorial discretion was 
exercised in a manner that did not result in many prosecutions.  
A decade after the legislation was enacted, the then Minister for Justice and Attorney-General, Matt Foley, and 
Minister for Women’s Policy, Judy Spence, established a taskforce to investigate the impact of the Criminal 
Code on the women of Queensland. Although surrogacy was not regulated by the Criminal Code, the taskforce 
investigated such practices because surrogacy attracted criminal sanctions. The report of the taskforce was 
published in 2000.14 The taskforce recognised the complex nature of issues raised by the topic of surrogacy, and 
the concerns expressed by some about the potential for such arrangements to exploit women who acted as 
surrogate mothers. Consensus was not reached about how surrogacy should be regulated, but a recommendation 
was made that altruistic surrogacy should not be a criminal offence.15 The government did not act on this 
recommendation. 
Almost a decade later, in 2008, altruistic surrogacy was back on the agenda of the Queensland Government. The 
Legislative Assembly established a Select Committee (the Lavarch Committee), chaired by the then Attorney-
General, Linda Lavarch, to review the Queensland law on altruistic surrogacy. Part of the terms of reference was 
whether altruistic surrogacy should be decriminalised. The Lavarch Committee released its report in October 
2008, and made 26 recommendations. As a threshold point, the committee recommended that altruistic 
surrogacy should not be a criminal offence.16 The committee’s recommendations in relation to who should be 
entitled to enter into a surrogacy arrangement were, to a certain extent, guarded. The committee noted that 
family structures had become more diverse than in the past,17 observing that ‘[a]n estimated 4,386 children live 
in same-sex families nationally, while 20 percent of lesbian women and 10 percent of gay men are parents’.18 
The committee also expressed the view that ‘concerns for the outcomes for children of same-sex parents are not 
supported by the available research’.19 However, the committee’s recommendation on the criterion that must be 
satisfied by intending parents was an ‘identified need for surrogacy’. This could be demonstrated through 
‘medical infertility, inability to carry a pregnancy or health risks’.20 In other words, the recommendation of the 
committee on the criteria for intending parents did not extend to ‘social infertility’ as in the case of a male same-
sex couple or single male for whom a surrogacy arrangement would be necessary to achieve parenthood. While 
not recommending social infertility as a criterion for accessing surrogacy, the committee recognised that there 
was currently a problem that needed to be addressed in relation to a lack of legal certainty for same-sex couples 
currently parenting children. The committee noted that these issues were broader than arose in altruistic 
surrogacy arrangements, and recommended that a review be conducted of the ‘legal status for children being 
cared for by same-sex parents with particular to the operation of the Status of Children Act 1978’.21 This 
recommendation reflected the committee’s concerns about the obstacles faced by same-sex couples when raising 
children, and the potentially adverse consequences of that situation for children. 
Following this review, the government enacted the Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld). This legislation facilitated parties 
entering into surrogacy arrangements, and prescribed the circumstances in which the court would order a 
                                                          
11 Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld), s 3(2). 
12 Evidence of such practices was provided to the Lavarch Select Committee Review: Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic 
Surrogacy Committee, Report (2008) pp 10-13; Brown C, Willmott L and White B, ‘Surrogacy in Queensland: Should Altruism be a 
Crime?’ (2008) 20 Bond L Rev 1 at 16-17.  
13 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 9; Brown, Willmott and White, n 12 at 15-16. 
14 Parliament of Queensland, Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code (2000). 
15 Parliament of Queensland, n 14, p 300. 
16 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 23, Recommendation 3: The committee 
recommended that the Queensland Government decriminalise altruistic surrogacy supported with an appropriate legislative and regulatory 
framework as described in later recommendations. 
17 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 6. 
18 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 6. 
19 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 78, referring to the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Seymour J and Magri S, ART, Surrogacy and Legal Parentage: A Comparative Legislative Review, Occasional Paper (2004). 
20 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 65. This criterion was incorporated into 
Recommendation 16. 
21 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 13, p 79, Recommendation 20. 
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parentage order in favour of an intending parent or parents. Importantly, heterosexual de facto couples 
(regardless of length of the relationship), same-sex couples as well as single men and women could enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement and later apply for a parentage order.22 
For the sake of completeness, the regulation of assisted reproductive technology in Queensland should be 
mentioned. In most modern surrogacy arrangements, the surrogate mother will become pregnant through in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF). The involvement of medical professionals is therefore generally required. Queensland has not 
passed legislation guiding IVF practice, so such practices are largely unregulated except through professional 
guidelines.23  
 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM BY THE NEWMAN LNP GOVERNMENT  
Prior to the last State election in Queensland, Campbell Newman made a commitment that, if elected, an LNP 
government would not amend the Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld). It now seems unlikely that this commitment will 
be honoured. When introducing legislation to reform Queensland’s Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld), the 
Attorney-General, Jarrod Bleijie, formally gave notice that the government would be reforming the surrogacy 
legislation by ‘repealing the provisions in the Surrogacy Act that deal with same-sex couples, de factos of less 
than two years and singles’.24  
The amending legislation has not yet been introduced into Parliament. However, Bleijie indicated that the 
legislation will be similar to the Bill proposed by Lawrence Springborg in 2009, the Family (Surrogacy) Bill 
2009 (Qld).25 Under the Springborg proposals, intending parents would have to qualify as an ‘eligible couple’ to 
enter into a surrogacy arrangement and to obtain a parentage order in their favour. ‘Eligible couple’ was defined 
to mean: 
 
(a)  a married couple; or 
(b)  a de facto couple comprising a male de facto partner and a female de facto partner who, when the eligible 
surrogacy arrangement was made, have lived together in a de facto relationship for at least 2 years.26 
 
This meant that heterosexual de facto couples in a relationship for less than two years, same-sex couples 
regardless of the duration of their relationship, and single men and women could not enter into a surrogacy 
arrangement, or have a parentage order made in their favour.  
As the proposed legislation discriminated against individuals in heterosexual de facto relationships of less than 
two years duration, same-sex couples, and single men and women by excluding them from the ambit of the 
definition of ‘eligible couple’, cl 6 of the Bill expressly provided that a person may make a decision authorised 
by the Family (Surrogacy) Bill 2009 ‘despite the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991’.27 Where proposed legislation 
does not comply with the ‘fundamental legislative principles’ contained in the Legislative Standards Act 1992 
(Qld), such as compliance with anti-discrimination legislation, the reason for that divergence must be explained 
in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.28 In relation to cl 6, the Explanatory Notes provided as follows: 
 
Overriding the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 ... clearly breaches fundamental legislative principles. However, the 
breach is justified because the imposition of discriminatory processes, particularly in relation to the paramount 
principles of the best interests of the child must be maintained above the rights of any person wishing participate (sic) in 
the altruistic surrogacy process, including any rights they may otherwise have under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 
not to experience discrimination.29 
 
                                                          
22 Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld), ss 9 and 21. 
23 For more detail about the professional guidelines, see below n 64 and accompanying text. 
24 Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (21 June 2012) p 994 (Jarrod Bleijie). 
25 Lawrence Springborg introduced this Bill into the Legislative Assembly on 11 September 2009. Later that month, on 26 November, the 
former Attorney-General, Cameron Dick, introduced the Surrogacy Bill 2009 (Qld). The latter Bill was subsequently passed. 
26 Family (Surrogacy) Bill 2009 (Qld), cl 9(2). 
27 Family (Surrogacy) Bill 2009 (Qld), cl 6. 
28 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld), s 23. A discussion of the process for doing this is contained in Office of the Queensland 
Parliamentary Counsel: http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Leg_Info/publications/FLPNotebook.pdf viewed 6 August 2012. 
29 Queensland Government, Family (Surrogacy) Bill 2009: Clause and Explanatory Notes, p 2: 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Bills/53PDF/2009/FamilySurrB09Exp_P.pdf viewed 5 February 2013.  
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The only implication that can be drawn from this explanation is that it was considered necessary to discriminate 
against this group by preventing them from becoming parents in order to safeguard the best interests of the 
child. That is, allowing such individuals to become parents would not be in the best interests of the child. 
Indeed, this position seems to be confirmed by Lawrence Springborg who, when introducing his Bill into 
Parliament in 2009, commented in the following way on the alternative surrogacy Bill proposed by the then 
Labor Government under which such groups were allowed access to surrogacy arrangements:30  
 
Mr Speaker, the Bligh Labor Government’s draft Bill insisted on opening the debate for altruistic surrogacy available to 
anyone and everyone and to prescribe to this approach would risk having the issue high jacked by social engineers who 
wish to use the opportunity to redefine the mainstream understanding of family. 
 
One final point should be made about the Bill proposed by Lawrence Springborg: it purported to have extra-
territorial effect. That is, the prohibitions introduced by the legislation, including entry into surrogacy 
arrangements by individuals who were not ‘eligible’ under the Bill, applied to acts done in Queensland as well 
as ‘acts done outside Queensland if the offender is ordinarily resident in Queensland at the time the act is 
done’.31 Therefore, a Queensland resident who is single, in a same-sex relationship, or a heterosexual de facto 
relationship of less than two years duration would commit an offence if he or she travelled interstate to enter 
into a surrogacy arrangement that was lawful in that particular jurisdiction. 
 
SURROGACY FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA 
Surrogacy law cannot be reviewed meaningfully without reference to the assisted reproductive technology 
framework that operates in the jurisdiction under review. Today assisted reproductive technology is invariably a 
feature of surrogacy regardless of the marital status or sexuality of those involved. Some jurisdictions prohibit 
the surrogate’s egg being used in the surrogacy procedure.32 As a result, IVF is an integral component of the 
surrogacy equation, as either a donor egg or the egg of the intended mother must be fertilised before being 
implanted into the surrogate. In cases where the surrogate’s egg is used in the procedure, assistance through 
artificial insemination will generally occur. As a result, surrogacy legislation should be read in conjunction with 
legislation relating to assisted reproductive technology. While the focus of this article is on surrogacy law, it 
should be understood that assisted reproductive technology legislation may also have an impact on whether a 
surrogacy arrangement can be entered into by the intended parent or parents.  
For the purpose of this article, it is important to review two aspects of the surrogacy laws. First, the provisions 
that relate to eligibility are obviously relevant. As we have seen in relation to the Family (Surrogacy) Bill 2009 
that was introduced into the Queensland Parliament by Lawrence Springborg, the eligibility criteria can exclude 
certain individuals from the ambit of the legislation.  
Secondly, the provisions that allow an intended parent or parents to apply for a parentage order are also critical. 
Unless a parentage order is made, the surrogate mother and her partner will be presumed to be the legal parents 
of the child.33 Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions prescribes a procedure to transfer parentage from the 
surrogate mother and her partner to the intended parent(s).34 The effect of a parentage order is that the child 
becomes a child of the intended parent(s), and the intended parent(s) become the parent(s) of the child. In 
addition, the child stops being the child of the birth parent(s) and the birth parent(s) stop being the parent(s) of 
the child. This is significant as important rights may accrue depending on who are the legal parents. These rights 
relate to citizenship, migration, medical treatment, intestacy and child support.35 In some jurisdictions, the 
ability to apply for a parentage order is restricted to married and heterosexual de facto couples. As such, even if 
                                                          
30 Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (11 November 2009) p 3259 (Lawrence Springborg). 
31 Family (Surrogacy) Bill 2009 (Qld), cl 54(b). 
32 For example, the Parentage Act 2004 (ACT), s 24(b), provides that neither birth parent of the child (that is, the surrogate mother or her 
partner) can be a genetic parent of the child. In Victoria, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic), s 40(1)(ab), provides that the 
Patient Review Panel may approve a surrogacy arrangement if the Panel is satisfied that the surrogate’s oocyte will not be used. 
33 Pursuant to the Status of Children Act 1978 (Qld), the woman who gives birth to a child is presumed to be the child’s mother and her 
partner or spouse, if she has one, is the child’s father. Equivalent legislation exists in other Australian States and Territories: Status of 
Children Act 1996 (NSW); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic); Parentage Act 2004 (ACT); Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas); Artificial 
Conception Act 1985 (WA); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA); Status of Children Act (NT). 
34 This is not the case in Tasmania where the legislation does not facilitate the transfer of legal parentage, or the Northern Territory where 
surrogacy legislation has not been enacted. 
35 Ellison and Karnchanit [2012] FamCA 602 at [100].  
This article is the accepted version of the paper published in the Journal of Law and Medicine: MK Smith, L 
Willmott, P Trowse, B White, ‘Back to the future: Prohibiting surrogacy for singles, same-sex and shorter-term 
heterosexual couples in Queensland’ (2013) 20(3) Journal of Law and Medicine 638-654. 
6 
 
individuals in a same-sex couple or a single man or woman enter a surrogacy arrangement and the surrogate 
mother relinquishes the child, the parent(s) may not be able to achieve the status of legal parent.  
 
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria 
Currently in Queensland, altruistic surrogacy may be available to married and de facto heterosexual couples, 
same-sex couples and single men and women. If there is a woman involved, there must be a medical reason for 
requiring a surrogacy arrangement such as inability to conceive or carry the fetus to term, or she is likely to have 
a child affected by a genetic condition or disorder.36 The legislation also refers to a social need for surrogacy 
which opens up access to males, whether they are single or in a same-sex relationship. As Queensland has not 
enacted legislation governing assisted reproductive technology practice, there are no legislative provisions 
regarding eligibility for assisted reproductive technology, and access to such services will depend on the 
practices of individual clinics. 
As in Queensland, married couples, heterosexual de facto couples, same-sex couples and single persons can 
access surrogacy in New South Wales.37 The assisted reproductive technology legislation in New South Wales38 
is silent on eligibility to access such services, so that legislation is not a barrier for single persons or same-sex 
couples.39 
In Victoria, entry into surrogacy arrangements is regulated by the assisted reproductive technology legislation.40 
As in Queensland and New South Wales, surrogacy is available to married couples, heterosexual de facto 
couples, same-sex couples and single men and women.41 The Victorian legislative regime has an added layer of 
complexity if, as will generally be the case, the surrogate mother requires assisted reproductive technology from 
a registered assisted reproductive technology provider to achieve a pregnancy. In this event, the surrogacy 
arrangement must be approved by the Patient Review Panel before the surrogacy can proceed.42 The Patient 
Review Panel may approve a surrogacy arrangement if it is satisfied that a doctor has reached a conclusion 
about certain matters,43 but those matters do not include the marital status and sexuality of the parties to the 
surrogacy arrangement. Accordingly, these matters are not relevant to approving a surrogacy arrangement in 
Victoria.  
                                                          
36 The legislation uses the term ‘eligible woman’ which is defined in Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld), s 14(2), as follows: “a woman who (a) is 
unable to conceive; or (b) if able to conceive (i) is likely to be unable, on medical grounds, either to carry a pregnancy or to give birth; or (ii) 
either (A) is unlikely to survive a pregnancy or birth; or (B) is likely to have her health significantly affected by a pregnancy or birth; or (iii) 
is likely to conceive (A) a child affected by a genetic condition or disorder, the cause of which is attributable to the woman; or (B) a child 
who is unlikely to survive a pregnancy or birth; or (C) a child whose health is likely to be significantly affected by a pregnancy or birth.” 
37 Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW), s 30. 
38 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW). 
39 For a discussion of the issues surrounding access to assisted reproductive technologies more generally in New South Wales, see Smith M, 
‘Reviewing Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology in New South Wales: The Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 
(NSW)’ (2008) 16 JLM 120. 
40 For a discussion of the issues surrounding access to assisted reproductive technologies more generally in Victoria, see Smith M, 
‘Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies in Victoria: The Impact of Changing Policy Concerning the Accessibility of In Vitro 
Fertilisation for Preimplantation Tissue-Typing’ (2012) 19 JLM 820. 
41 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic), s 3, defines ‘surrogacy arrangement’ as “an arrangement, agreement or understanding 
whether formal or informal, under which a woman agrees with another person to become or try to become pregnant, with the intention – (a) 
that a child born as a result of the pregnancy is to be treated as the child, not of her, but of another person or persons (whether by adoption 
agreement or otherwise); or (b) of transferring custody or guardianship in a child born as a result of the pregnancy to another person or 
persons; or (c) that the right to care for a child born as a result of the pregnancy be permanently surrendered to another person or persons.” 
The reference in the definition to ‘person or persons’ indicates that both single persons and couples can take part in a surrogacy arrangement 
in Victoria. This is also reflected in the Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic), s 17. The Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic), s 40, 
prescribes matters the Patient Review Panel should consider when approving surrogacy arrangements. One of these is that if the 
commissioning parent is a woman, the woman is likely to place her life or health, or that of the baby, at risk if she becomes pregnant, carries 
a pregnancy or gives birth. By implication, the legislation has contemplated the commissioning parent not being a woman and therefore 
being a man. In addition, there are no restrictions in either piece of legislation which limit the sexuality of couples or single persons entering 
into surrogacy arrangements. 
42 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic), s 39. This section provides that a registered assisted reproductive technology provider 
may carry out a treatment procedure on a woman under a surrogacy arrangement only if the surrogacy arrangement has been approved by 
the Patient Review Panel. However, the Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic), s 23, contemplates surrogacy arrangements that do not require 
assistance from a registered assisted reproductive technology provider. The section applies if the surrogate mother became pregnant as a 
result of artificial insemination whether or not this was a result of treatment by an assisted reproductive technology provider. 
43 These matters include the doctor being satisfied that the commissioning parent is unlikely to become pregnant, carry a pregnancy or give 
birth; the surrogate mother’s oocyte will not be used in the surrogate procedure; the surrogate has previously carried a pregnancy and that 
the surrogate is at least 25 years of age: Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2009 (Vic), s 40. 
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Heterosexual and same-sex couples and single persons who currently engage in altruistic surrogacy 
arrangements in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria can obtain parentage orders.44  
 
Australian Capital Territory 
Surrogacy arrangements in the Australian Capital Territory are referred to as ‘substitute parent agreements’. The 
legislation does not limit who may enter into a substitute parent agreement. Further, as the Australian Capital 
Territory has not enacted legislation governing assisted reproductive technology practice, there are no legislative 
provisions regarding eligibility for assisted reproductive technology, and access to such services will depend on 
the practices of individual clinics. 
However, a parentage order can only be made if there is a substitute parent agreement under which two people 
(the substitute parents) have indicated their intention to apply for a parentage order in relation to the child.45 
This precludes single men and women from applying for a parentage order in the Australian Capital Territory. 
Same-sex couples are able to both enter into a substitute parent agreement and seek a parentage order in the 
Australian Capital Territory.  
 
South Australia 
The South Australian legislation precludes same-sex couples and single persons from entering into surrogacy 
arrangements. Under the Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), a surrogacy contract is illegal and void,46 but not 
if it is a ‘recognised surrogacy agreement’47 as defined by the Act.48 One requirement of a ‘recognised surrogacy 
agreement’ is that the surrogate mother must agree to surrender custody of and rights in the child to two other 
persons called the commissioning parents. Therefore single men and women are excluded from entering into a 
recognised surrogacy agreement.49 Another requirement is that the commissioning parents must be legally 
married or have cohabited continuously together as de facto husband and wife for a period of three years prior to 
the agreement.50 This requirement excludes same-sex couples. Only those parties to a ‘recognised surrogacy 
agreement’ are permitted to apply for a parentage order under the Act.51 Therefore, same-sex couples and single 
persons cannot apply for a parentage order pursuant to a surrogacy arrangement in South Australia. 
 
Western Australia  
The Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) regulates ‘surrogacy arrangements’ in that State. The legislation does not contain 
any prohibitions on who may enter into such arrangements. Therefore, heterosexual and same-sex couples as 
well as single men and women are not prohibited by the surrogacy legislation from entering into a surrogacy 
arrangement.52  
However, restrictions apply if the intending parents want to obtain a parentage order. Before a parentage order 
can be obtained under the Act, the intending parent or parents must qualify as either an ‘eligible couple’ or 
‘eligible person’.53 The drafting of the legislation is quite complex, but the effect is that a married or 
heterosexual de facto couple can apply for a parentage order if there is medical infertility or there is a risk of a 
child being born with a genetic abnormality. A lesbian couple could also apply for a parentage order if either of 
the women is infertile or there is a risk of a child being born with a genetic abnormality. A single woman may 
also satisfy the eligibility requirements if she is medically infertile or there is a risk of a child being born with a 
genetic abnormality. The drafting of the eligibility provisions in the surrogacy legislation means that a single 
male or a male same-sex couple will not be able to obtain a parentage order. 
                                                          
44 Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld), ss 22 and 39; Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW), ss 12 and 39; Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic), ss 22 and 26. 
45 Parentage Act 2004 (ACT), s 24(c). 
46 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10G(1). 
47 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10G(4).  
48 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10HA(2). 
49 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10HA(2)(a). 
50 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10HA(2)(b)(iii). 
51 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10HB(2). 
52 Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA), s 3, defines surrogacy arrangement as an arrangement for a woman (the birth mother) to seek to become 
pregnant and give birth to a child and for a person or persons other than the birth mother (the arranged parent or parents) to raise the child, 
but the term does not include an arrangement entered into after the birth mother becomes pregnant unless it is in variation of a surrogacy 
arrangement involving the same parties. 
53 Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA), s 19. 
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Underpinning the surrogacy legislation in Western Australia is the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 
(WA), which must be adhered to if assisted reproductive technology services are required for a surrogacy 
arrangement.54 While originally the Act required those seeking access to assisted reproductive technology 
services to be either married or in a heterosexual de facto relationship, access to services for single and lesbian 
women is now permitted as a result of the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Reform) Act 2002 (WA) in cases 
where such women are medically infertile (s 23(1)(a)).55 
Therefore surrogacy is available in Western Australia for heterosexual couples, female same-sex couples and 
single women (provided there is medical infertility or a risk of a child with a genetic abnormality), and these 
intending parent(s) may also apply for a parentage order. 
 
Tasmania 
The Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993 (Tas) prohibits surrogacy contracts in relation to child bearing.56 The 
legislation makes it an offence to provide technical or professional services in relation to achieving a pregnancy 
which is the subject of a surrogacy contract,57 and also to introduce potential parties to a surrogacy 
arrangement.58 However, it does not prohibit individuals from entering into an altruistic surrogacy arrangement. 
This means that there are no legislative prohibitions on altruistic surrogacies being entered into by same-sex 
couples or single persons. On 29th August 2012 the Tasmanian Legislative Council passed the Surrogacy Bill 
2011. The Bill received royal assent on 26th October 2012 and, at the time of writing, awaits proclamation. Once 
proclaimed, the Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) will allow heterosexual couples, same sex couples, single men and 
single women, access to altruistic surrogacy in Tasmania.59 As Tasmania has not enacted legislation governing 
assisted reproductive technology practice, there are no legislative provisions regarding eligibility for this 
technology, and access to such services will depend on the practices of individual clinics. Although the current 
surrogacy legislation does not facilitate a transfer of legal parentage to intended parents, the new legislation will 
open this path to parenthood for intended parents.60  
 
Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory has not enacted legislation that regulates surrogacy arrangements. This means there are 
no legislative limitations on who can enter into such arrangements, and access will depend on the availability of 
                                                          
54 Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA), s 23, states: ‘(1) An in vitro fertilisation procedure may be carried out where – (a) it 
would be likely to benefit – (i) persons who, as a couple, are unable to conceive a child due to medical reasons; or (ia) a woman who is 
unable to conceive a child due to medical reasons; or (ii) a couple or a woman whose child would otherwise be likely to be affected by a 
genetic abnormality or a disease; or (iii) a woman who is unable to give birth to a child due to medical reasons and is a party to a surrogacy 
arrangement (as defined in the Surrogacy Act 2008 section 3) that is lawful.’ 
55 However, the position in Western Australia remains complicated because of the wording of s 23(1)(c) of the Human Reproductive 
Technology Act 1991 (WA). Section 23(1)(c) states that ‘any persons seeking to be regarded, in applying paragraph (a) [of section 23], as 
members of a couple are – (i) married to each other; or (ii) in a de facto relationship with each other and are of the opposite sex to each 
other’. On the basis of this provision, it seems to exclude same-sex de facto couples from accessing assisted reproductive technology 
services. Yet, this is at odds with the Explanatory Notes to the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Reform) Bill 2001 (WA), which, at cl 70 
states: ‘This amendment makes provisions that will allow a woman who is unable to conceive a child for medical reasons, or whose child is 
likely to be affected by a genetic abnormality or disease, to have access to in vitro fertilisation procedures. There is no restriction on whether 
the woman is married, single or in a de facto relationship with a person of the same or opposite sex.’ Clause 70 goes on to state: ‘[p]rovision 
is also made for heterosexual couples to access in vitro fertilisation procedures where the woman is not infertile, but there are medical 
reasons preventing [a couple from] conceiving a child, or their child is likely to be affected by a genetic abnormality or disease.’ On the 
basis of this latter paragraph, the authors are of the opinion that s 23(1)(c) of the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) should be 
interpreted to mean that the marriage or heterosexual relationship requirement is only intended to apply to circumstances where a woman 
seeks treatment with her male partner on the basis that the inability to conceive stems from the male partner’s infertility (or other medical 
condition), with the woman suffering no impairment to her fertility (ordinarily, a woman in these circumstances would not be eligible for 
treatment under the Act). Thus, if interpreted in such a way, this provision would be irrelevant in the context of a lesbian couple seeking 
access to services. Furthermore, this interpretation is supported by the underlying intention of the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay 
Reform) Act 2002 (WA). As outlined in the Explanatory Notes to the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Reform) Bill 2001, the amendments 
to the legislation were intended to enable single and lesbian women to gain access to assisted reproductive technology services. 
Additionally, this requirement also appears to be inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation preventing discrimination on the basis of 
marital status and would therefore need to be interpreted in a non-discriminatory way: see Tarrant S, ‘Western Australia’s Persistent 
Enforcement of an Invalid Law: Section 23(c) of the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA)’ (2000) 8 JLM 92. 
56 Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993 (Tas), Long Title. 
57 Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993 (Tas), s 5. 
58 Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993 (Tas), s 4. 
59 Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) ss 5,7. 
60 Surrogacy Act 2012 (Tas) s 13. 
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and restrictions on assisted reproductive technology services generally. It also means that no parentage orders 
can be made. 
 
Family Court orders 
For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that there is another option for those who are unable to 
obtain a parentage order by virtue of their marital status or sexuality. These parents may still apply to the 
Family Court for a parenting order. A parenting order deals with who a child lives with, the time a child spends 
with certain persons, the parental responsibility for the child and any aspect of the care, welfare or development 
of the child. When assessing these orders, the court takes into account matters relating to the welfare of the 
child. The marital status and sexuality of the applicant are not factors which the court has to consider under the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).61 However, if the surrogacy agreement itself is deemed to be illegal under State or 
Territory legislation, this may have an impact on the court’s decision to make a parenting order.62 In addition, 
parenting orders do not confer legal parentage on the intended parents. They simply provide a person with the 
responsibility of caring for the child until he or she reaches 18 years. 
 
PROPOSED ALTERATIONS OF THE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA ARE UNJUSTIFIABLE 
Informed by that backdrop of the national surrogacy framework, the authors now turn to examine why the 
proposed LNP reforms are not justifiable. They argue that the proposed changes are out of step with the current 
trend of reforms for assisted reproductive technology generally, that they are discriminatory, and that the 
purported rationale for the changes – the welfare of children – is not sustained by the evidence. 
 
Out of step with current trends for accessing assisted reproductive technology services 
Although there are some distinctive ethical considerations associated with the practice of surrogacy, the 
progression of assisted reproductive technology policy and practice provides a useful comparison, and has 
significant implications for the issue of eligibility for surrogacy. The discussion below demonstrates how the 
law and practice in other jurisdictions has responded to social attitudes concerning the question of who should 
be able to become a parent with the assistance of reproductive technologies.  
As discussed above, in many cases where altruistic surrogacy is contemplated, access to assisted reproductive 
technology is often necessary so that such agreements can be carried into effect. In some jurisdictions, 
legislation regulating assisted reproductive technology has been enacted. In the other jurisdictions (including 
Queensland), no legislation has been passed to address the broader issues raised by IVF practices.63 As a result, 
in those jurisdictions, IVF is regulated by way of a national system of professional guidelines. Under this 
national framework, the Fertility Society of Australia (FSA) requires all assisted reproductive technology 
centres to gain accreditation from its Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC)64 and the 
accreditation process requires all centres to comply with ethical guidelines issued by the National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC).65 Of particular significance for this article is the fact that the national 
guidelines that regulate assisted reproductive technology practices do not address the question of eligibility. This 
                                                          
61 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC. Section 60CC(3)(g) mentions additional considerations (as opposed to primary considerations) 
including the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background of the child and of either of the child’s parents. However, there is no mention of the 
sexuality of the parents.  
62 However, see Ellison v Karnchanit [2012] FamCA 602 per Ryan J where the court was asked to make a parentage order in the face of an 
illegal commercial surrogacy agreement. ‘Of course imprisonment of the applicants would see two much loved children ... inexplicably 
separated from the only people they have known as parents. The potential for long term psychological and emotional harm to the children 
were such an event to come to pass is obvious’ (at [3]). His Honour further commented (at [88]): ’I feel bound to observe that I find this 
process of authorisation most uncomfortable. What the court is required to do is to balance two competing and potentially irreconcilably 
conflicting concepts.’ 
63 See Smith M, ‘Revisiting Old Ground in Light of New Dilemmas: The Need for Queensland to Reconsider the Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies’ (2007) 7 QUTLJJ 425. 
64 The terms of the accreditation process administered by the RTAC require clinics to adhere to all relevant legislation and applicable 
guidelines and the RTAC Code of Practice: Fertility Society of Australia, Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee, Code of 
Practice for Assisted Reproductive Technology Units (revised October 2010). 
65 National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice 
and Research (2007) (NHMRC Guidelines). 
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leaves the position concerning access to this technology in Queensland (and other non-statutory jurisdictions) 
unregulated.66 
Legislation concerning assisted reproductive technology has been enacted in Victoria, New South Wales, South 
Australia and Western Australia. With the exception of the New South Wales legislative framework, eligibility 
was covered by the statutory schemes and the various legislative requirements stipulated that those seeking 
access to assisted reproductive technology services should be either married or in a stable heterosexual de facto 
relationship.67 However, such requirements in Victoria and South Australia were deemed to be inconsistent with 
Commonwealth legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status. The marriage 
requirement under the former Victorian legislation (which has since been reformed) was challenged in the case 
of McBain v Victoria (2000) 99 FCR 116; [2000] FCA 1009, due to the fact that a doctor could not comply with 
both the Commonwealth legislation and the former Victorian legislation when approached by a single woman 
who was seeking access to assisted reproductive technology.68 The Federal Court of Australia held that the 
Victorian legislation was discriminatory and, because the marriage requirement was inconsistent with the 
Commonwealth legislation, it was invalid under s 109 of the Constitution.69 Similarly, in Pearce v South 
Australian Health Commission (1996) 66 SASR 486, the Supreme Court of South Australia declared that the 
marriage requirement contained in the former Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA)70 
was inconsistent with the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and, therefore, invalid. In Western Australia, 
statutory amendments were enacted to remove the discriminatory nature of the marriage requirement under the 
legislation.71 
The statutory frameworks addressing eligibility also contained additional requirements that obstructed access to 
assisted reproductive technology for single and lesbian women. The legislative provisions required prospective 
participants to show that they were either medically infertile or at risk of passing on a genetic condition when 
conceiving naturally. Such terms had been construed narrowly.72 In Victoria, the former regulatory body, the 
Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA), had advised licensed clinics that women (including those who are not 
married or in a de facto relationship) could only be treated after a medical assessment confirming clinical 
infertility. Similar approaches were also adopted in Western Australia73 and South Australia.74 
Attitudes towards eligibility for assisted reproductive technology services have shifted significantly over the 
past decade. This is particularly well demonstrated by the review of the Victorian legislation undertaken by the 
                                                          
66 It should be noted that in Queensland, discrimination claims have been commenced against assisted reproductive technology clinicians 
and centres in cases where access to assisted reproductive technology has been limited on the basis of marital status or sexual orientation. 
See below, n 84 and accompanying text. 
67 Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic), s 8; Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA), s 13(3); Human Reproductive 
Technology Act 1991 (WA), s 23(1)(c). 
68 Section 22(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) states that ‘it is unlawful for a person who ... provides goods or services ... to 
discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person’s sex, marital status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy’. The Federal 
Court of Australia adopted a liberal interpretation of the term ‘services’ under the Commonwealth Act, noting that the term is ‘eminently apt 
to pick up a service rendered by a medical practitioner, and there is no occasion to introduce ... a qualification that a child will be born into a 
family as a result of natural processes involving a married couple’ (at [13]). 
69 Section 109 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act states that ‘[w]hen a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the 
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid’. 
70 Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA), s 13(3). The legislation was updated by the Reproductive Technology 
(Clinical Practice) (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2009 (SA). 
71 The terms ‘married’ or ‘de facto relationship’ in the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) previously only applied to 
heterosexual couples, but this was modified by the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act 2002 (WA). ‘The definitions of de 
facto relationship and de facto partner include same-sex relationships as well as heterosexual relationships’: Reproductive Technology 
Council, Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act 2002 – Amendment of the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 and the 
Artificial Conception Act 1985 (2002), http://www.rtc.org.au/clinics/docs/Info-Gay_and_Lesbian.pdf viewed 9 August 2012). See above n 
54. 
72 For example, in Victoria, the former statutory body, the Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA), had sought advice on interpreting the 
statutory term ‘unlikely to become pregnant’. The advice provided to the ITA suggested that assisted reproductive technology participants 
should be medically infertile to be eligible for such services under the statute, with services only being accessible after a medical opinion 
confirming the inability to conceive naturally. See Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproduction & Adoption: Should the 
Current Eligibility Criteria in Victoria be Changed? Consultation Paper (2003) pp 26-27. 
73 Parliament of Western Australia, Select Committee on the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991, Report (1999) p 46. 
74 South Australian Council on Reproductive Technology (SACRT), ‘Eligibility for Assisted Reproductive Technology’ Memorandum 1, 
reported in South Australian Council on Reproductive Technology, Annual Report (2004) p 21: ’Infertility refers to the inability or 
significantly reduced capacity of a person to conceive or otherwise bear or father a child, evidenced by: (i) a reasonable period of 
unprotected intercourse with no resulting pregnancy; or (ii) a proven medical condition resulting in reduced fertility; or (iii) other evidence 
presented to the treating medical practitioner … Further as a guide: a man may be considered infertile if his female partner has been unable 
to conceive a child naturally; a woman may be considered infertile if, with a male partner, she has been unable to conceive a child naturally.’ 
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Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), which noted that the eligibility criteria under the former 
legislative scheme had been applied inconsistently to married women, women in heterosexual de facto 
relationships, and women without legally recognised partners.75 The VLRC observed that a more strict 
interpretation of the relevant Victorian eligibility term ‘unlikely to become pregnant’ had been ‘applied to 
women without legally recognised male partners’ to prevent them from accessing reproductive services in 
Victoria.76 The VLRC noted that this interpretation meant that, in practice, a single woman or a woman in a 
same-sex relationship could only be eligible if she were medically infertile (which is generally limited to 
physiological reasons), while a woman with a male partner could also point to other reasons such as the 
infertility of her partner, a psychological inability to have sex or some other unexplained inability to conceive, to 
satisfy the eligibility criteria.77 It was for this reason that the Commission recommended a broader approach to 
the issue of eligibility, and that criteria not be limited to medical infertility.78 The VLRC had formed this view 
following an extensive public consultation process, noting that ‘the marital status requirement is not only 
inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination, but it also bears no relationship to the health and wellbeing 
of children’.79 These issues of discrimination and the wellbeing of children born to same-sex couples and single 
persons are discussed further below. 
Notably, the VLRC’s recommendations were adopted in the reformed legislative scheme,80 enabling the 
provision of assisted reproductive technology services to single women and same-sex couples, even if those 
individuals are not medically infertile. Although the requirement concerning the need to establish medical 
infertility may still apply in South Australia and Western Australia, where there is an eligibility criterion under 
the legislation for the provision of these services, in the remaining jurisdictions (including New South Wales, 
where the legislation does not impose eligibility criteria), the issue of who can access these services is 
determined by individual clinics. In this latter context, there are no barriers imposed by the State to prevent the 
provision of such services to single persons, same-sex couples, or de facto couples of less than two years.  
The above discussion demonstrates that in the wider context of assisted reproductive technology, the notion that 
only the traditional nuclear family should be afforded permission to access such services has weakened 
significantly alongside the recognition of a more diverse range of family structures.  
 
Discriminatory nature of proposed amendments 
If the LNP Government’s intended amendments are modelled on the Springborg proposals, they will exclude 
single persons, same-sex couples and heterosexual de facto couples of less than two years from becoming 
parents through surrogacy. As noted above, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill sought to defend this 
discriminatory approach by pointing to concerns about the best interests of children born to such prospective 
parents.81 However, according to current research, referred to in the next section, there is not a reliable evidence 
base to conclude that being raised by such individuals or couples poses any harm to children who may be born 
into alternative family settings. For this reason, the justification discussed above for reforming the law in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the principles of Queensland’s anti-discrimination legislation is unconvincing. 
This section of the article considers the prospect that the discriminatory nature of the proposed amendments may 
be contrary to the Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation.  
In the general context of assisted reproductive technology, it was established above that legislative provisions 
regulating access to services, which impose restrictions on the grounds of marital status, have been found to be 
inconsistent with Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation. In the surrogacy context, the Lavarch 
Committee also observed the potential for conflict between legislation at the State level and the Commonwealth 
                                                          
75 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption Final Report, Report No 10 (2007) p 67. 
76 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 67.  
77 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, pp 52-53. 
78 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72. The Commission’s Final Report suggested (p 68) that a ‘woman be eligible for treatment if she 
is unlikely to become pregnant and that her inability to become pregnant (or to carry a pregnancy or give birth to a child, or likelihood of 
transmitting a genetic abnormality or disease) be assessed on the basis of the circumstances in which she finds herself (whether single, 
married, in a same-sex relationship, psychologically averse to having sexual intercourse with a man, or otherwise)’.  
79 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 67. 
80 The eligibility criteria permit access in cases where a doctor is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the woman is unlikely to become 
pregnant other than by a treatment procedure, or the woman is unlikely to be able to carry a pregnancy or give birth to a child without a 
treatment procedure, or the woman is at risk of transmitting a genetic abnormality or genetic disease as a result of a pregnancy conceived 
other than by a treatment procedure, including a genetic abnormality or genetic disease for which the woman’s partner is the carrier: 
Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic), s 10(2). 
81 See above n 29 and accompanying text. 
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anti-discrimination legislation.82 The committee obtained advice from the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commission, which stated that ‘[s]tate law and regulation must not restrict access to services or 
discriminate on the basis of marital status, sexuality, race or religion’.83 If the Queensland surrogacy legislation 
is amended to require a clinician or an assisted reproductive technology centre to refuse to provide assisted 
reproductive technology services for the purpose of carrying through a surrogacy arrangement (on the basis of 
the participants’ marital status or sexuality), there is room to argue that such requirement would be inconsistent 
with the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). Although in this context assisted reproductive technology services 
are provided to the surrogate mother, the cost of such services will most likely be met by the intended parent(s). 
This means that all of the relevant parties would be privy to an agreement for the provision of IVF services. A 
clinician who is not able to provide such services on the basis of the marital status or sexuality of the 
participants would arguably be unable to comply with both State legislation and the Commonwealth anti-
discrimination provisions. 
If the surrogacy legislation is amended in the form proposed by the LNP Government, this would not be the first 
time that a Queensland government has endorsed discriminatory legislation that seeks to prevent certain classes 
of people, who require assistance by way of reproductive technologies in order to become parents, from 
accessing such services. In the case of JM v QFG,84 a lesbian woman, JM, and her partner of four years were 
denied access to treatment by a Queensland fertility clinic. The applicant claimed that the clinic had 
discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation and was therefore in breach of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). Ultimately, it was held that there had been no discrimination against the 
applicant, although the reasoning underpinning this decision is somewhat controversial and has been challenged 
in academic commentary.85 Following the JM case, the Queensland Government sought to ensure that the 
potential for future discrimination claims in this context were averted by amending the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1991 (Qld). The amended legislation enables assisted reproductive technology centres to refuse to provide 
reproductive services on the grounds of a participant’s relationship status or sexuality.86  
The LNP Government’s proposals are underpinned by discriminatory reasoning. Although the proposal to limit 
the eligibility requirements for entering into surrogacy arrangements is purportedly focused on protecting the 
welfare of children born as a result of such arrangements, the basis of the concern appears to be that a child 
should not be brought up by individuals who fall outside the ‘traditional’ family model.87 This is concerning as 
such an approach is clearly in conflict with the general principle of non-discrimination reflected in both State 
and Commonwealth law. This discriminatory approach is particularly concerning as it appears to be part of the 
government’s wider conservative reform agenda as illustrated, eg, by recent reforms of the Relationships Act 
2011 (Qld).  
 
No evidence of harm to children 
 
The need to demonstrate harm 
Preventing access to surrogacy for heterosexual de facto couples in a relationship for less than two years, all 
same-sex couples, and single men and women needs to be justified. The proposed reforms involve 
discriminating against a cohort of people on the basis of their relationship status and so there is an onus resting 
on those who advocate for this position to clearly justify it. Traditionally, in a liberal society, this requires the 
demonstration of harm. Liberal theories on regulation view state intervention in the lives of its citizens as an 
interference with individual autonomy which can only be justified when it is necessary to prevent harm.88 The 
harm principle, famously espoused by JS Mill, states that ‘[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will, is to prevent harm to others’.89 The above 
discussion of statements in Hansard suggests that the LNP Government considers that the ‘harm’ here will be to 
                                                          
82 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 39. 
83 Parliament of Queensland, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, n 12, p 39. 
84 [1996] Queensland Anti-Discrimination Board, No H38 of 1996 (unrep, 31 January 1997, President Atkinson). 
85 For further discussion of this case, see Smith, n 60. See also Stuhmcke A, ‘Limiting Access to Assisted Reproduction: JM v QFG’ (2002) 
16 Australian Journal of Family Law 1. 
86 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 45A(1), which states: ‘Section 46 [which prohibits discrimination in the supply of goods or 
services] does not apply to the provision of assisted reproductive technology services if the discrimination is on the basis of relationship 
status or sexuality.’ 
87 See above n 30 and accompanying text. 
88 Gray J (ed), John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991).  
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the welfare of children born via surrogacy arrangements to these groups of people.90 But is this claim 
substantiated by evidence? One would expect clear evidence to justify excluding an identified cohort of people 
from having access to the means to have a family through surrogacy arrangements. 
 
The VLRC report 
The most significant Australian review of this issue in recent times was conducted by the VLRC in its Assisted 
Reproductive Technology and Adoption report discussed above.91 As part of its review, the VLRC 
commissioned and published a literature review in 2004, which considered a number of studies that assessed the 
outcomes for children born following the provision of assisted reproductive technology in diverse family 
formations.92 The studies referred to in the published literature review considered the development of children 
who were raised in a broad range of ‘non-traditional’ family structures such as singles and same-sex couples. 
The VLRC also engaged with a further body of empirical research in its final report.93 
 
Same-sex parents  
Despite a number of methodological challenges faced by researchers in this field (particularly in relation to the 
small sample sizes in many of the studies),94 the VLRC noted that ‘there is sound evidence that children born 
into families with ... same-sex parents do at least as well as other children’.95 It should be observed that while 
the majority of the literature in this field has formed the view that the outcomes for children of same-sex parents 
are generally favourable, there have been studies which indicate that children in gay or lesbian families have 
experienced bullying and discrimination because of their parents’ sexuality.96 These studies, however, also 
noted that such children tend to be more ‘broad-minded, tolerant and empathetic than children born into 
conventional families’.97 
In an attempt to try and overcome the methodological challenges of the research in this field, the results of a 
number of studies have been aggregated, with the conclusion that the ‘meta-analyses confirm that there are no 
significant discrepancies between studies which report favourable outcomes for children brought up by same-
sex couples’.98 Significantly, the VLRC noted: 
 
The research indicates that children with lesbian and gay parents do not differ at all, or significantly, from children with 
heterosexual parents when assessed according to a range of standard criteria measuring parent-child relationships, 
socio-emotional development, psychiatric ratings and gender development.99 
 
Single parents  
A number of studies have also been undertaken which suggest that ‘most children in single-parent families do 
just as well as the average child in a two-parent family’,100 although there is also some research which suggest 
that children ‘in single-parent families do less well on educational and psychological measures than children in 
two-parent families’.101 However, again, the VLRC observed that it may be misleading to rely on such studies as 
they often involve children who have been raised following divorce, compared to studies which examine the 
outcomes for children of single mothers who have conceived by way of donor insemination: 
                                                          
90 See above n 29 and accompanying text. 
91 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72. 
92 Victorian Law Reform Commission, McNair R, Outcomes for Children Born of ART in a Diverse Range of Families, Occasional Paper 
(2004). 
93 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, Ch 2. 
94 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 32. 
95 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 30. 
96 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 33. 
97 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 33. 
98 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 32. 
99 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 32. The Victorian Law Reform Commission did note, however, that the majority of studies 
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When children being brought up by single parents show negative effects this can generally be attributed to factors 
associated with their parents’ separation, such as parental hostility and the economic consequences of divorce, rather 
than fatherlessness itself. By contrast, the single mothers by choice who made submissions to [the VLRC’s review] 
appeared to be well prepared for single parenthood prior to conception, both emotionally and financially.102 
 
No demonstrated harm 
As noted above, the onus of demonstrating harm rests with those seeking to justify prohibiting certain conduct. 
The most comprehensive review of the literature undertaken in Australia to date by the VLRC reveals that this 
claim cannot be substantiated. The limited literature concerning children raised by single parents is 
inconclusive, and the evidence in relation to children raised by same-sex couples suggests that children raised by 
such families are at no greater risk of harm than children raised by heterosexual couples. And although it did not 
purport to examine the literature dealing with ‘non-traditional’ family structures in the same depth, the Lavarch 
Committee reached a similar conclusion, stating, ‘the committee believes concerns for the outcomes for children 
of same-sex parents are not supported by the available research’.103 These findings have also been supported by 
a range of studies since the VLRC review.104 While ongoing research is needed to better understand how 
children experience surrogacy arrangements in general and when raised by single and same-sex parents,105 it is 
clear that the required evidence base to justify a plainly discriminatory approach is lacking. 
 
CAUTION, SAFEGUARDS AND EVIDENCE-BASED REGULATION, NOT DISCRIMINATION 
In response to some of the concerns that have been raised in the surrogacy debate, it could be argued that it is a 
distinct category of reproduction that warrants particular consideration.106 It has certainly been recognised that 
the practice of surrogacy raises a number of distinct ethical issues that go beyond the scope of general 
reproductive treatments.107 When considering the regulatory issues surrounding surrogacy, the VLRC noted: 
 
The commission’s assessment of surrogacy is that it is sufficiently different from other forms of ART to warrant a 
cautious regulatory approach, with an additional set of requirements for access to treatment services. Our view is that 
the eligibility criteria that apply to surrogacy should address the risks associated with surrogacy arrangements that do 
not arise in other forms of ART. In particular, surrogacy involves another party (the surrogate mother) who carries the 
child throughout pregnancy but will be asked to relinquish that child upon birth.108 
 
Undoubtedly, these additional factors in the surrogacy context justify a distinct regulatory approach. However, 
as explained above, the potential for concern arising from this distinct use of assisted reproductive technology is 
not necessarily correlative to the marital status or sexual orientation of the intended parents. In addressing the 
fact that there should be a distinct category of eligibility criteria in the context of surrogacy arrangements, it has 
                                                          
102 Victorian Law Reform Commission, n 72, p 35. 
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been noted that the ‘protection of children and surrogate mothers must be the primary concern of any law 
regulating surrogacy’.109 Other Australian jurisdictions, such as Victoria, have displayed a willingness to 
embrace diversity in terms of adapting to contemporary social attitudes, which in turn has led to a position 
where modern family structures are given recognition. Most significantly, it was noted that: 
 
The commission does not believe it is justified to require people who are commissioning a surrogacy arrangement to be 
married or in a heterosexual de facto relationship. This reflects the commission’s conclusion that a person’s marital 
status or sexuality are not factors that are considered by child welfare authorities or experts to be predictors of harm to 
children.110 
 
The requirement that those seeking to enter a surrogacy arrangement in Queensland should conform to the 
‘traditional’ family model is a precarious position which fails to recognise modern social attitudes and realities. 
In 2010, 34% of all children born in Australia were born outside of marriage.111 In the context of natural 
procreation, children are frequently born to women who would fall short of the eligibility criteria outlined by the 
proposed amendments in Queensland, where the woman is single, is in a same-sex relationship,112 or where she 
has been with her male partner for less than two years.  
If the key concerns in the context of surrogacy arrangements are the welfare of any resulting child and the 
interests of the surrogate mother, then the restrictions imposed with regard to eligibility should align with those 
purposes. Proportionate safeguards designed to promote the best interests of children and the interests of 
surrogate mothers are eminently justifiable. But this is not what is being proposed under the LNP reforms. 
Instead, marital status and sexual orientation are adopted as measures of child welfare and then used as a basis 
to exclude access to surrogacy for some groups of people. Such an approach is not supported by evidence and is 
discriminatory. The current authors urge the LNP Government to reconsider its position and to do so informed 
by the large body of available empirical evidence, fundamental principles of law such as non-discrimination, 
and the realities of modern-day Australian society.  
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